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INTRODUCTI ON.
Crime is an offence against the public and since justice
hasbeen sought and desired by the people law has been
constructed by their representatives that should govern
them in their relations to the publicat largeand it
is essential to the civilization of a cotntrythat
laws should be madeand enforcedby which the health,
peace and happiness of its citizens should be preservd,
and whenever an act is done by any of its citizens
which trangresses the esta lished law of the country
affecting its citizens, it has been called by cornon
usagejs crime, Since the penalty attaching for the
eommtsion of a crime is the deprivation of a mans
liberty, which in this country is manb blessed heritae,
it is a matter of great importance in determining
whether a crime has been committed or not to look and
seewhat was the condition of the mans mind when the
act was done, for, his mind may have been pareand in
that case, I maintain, there is no crime, and it is
the accused privtlege to have brought to his assistance
any doubt that may arise, because it is a fundamental
maxim of the lawthat it is better that the State should
stand the chances of an injustice rather than that
an innocent man should be punished, and this has
become so thoY-ouhlY ingrafted into our jurisprudence
that it can never be removed,
In the following pages I shall attempt to follow the
directions the ourts have taken in the -riminal .7uris-
prudence of our country, taking only one phase of the
many interesting points inCriminal Law-Criminal Intent,-
and I have taken up a particular line with reference to
liquor legislation in this country because tle liquor
business has grown to such immense proportions and
and while a lawful, still not an honorable, business
h-'s been so hedged about by our Tegislaturesw;ith restric-
tions and the popular will of thte people is so adverse
to its use that the rules of the law have been turned
j: om the paths on' right and jstice
to meet as it seemed the popular will, but be that
as laudable as it may, still there are principles of
justice, as old as th. law itself , hich by a mere
personal desire cannot be turned aside and while liquor
is recognized by the law as a lawful business, when
conducted according to certain rules and regulations,
those who sell, ahatever may be their condition in the
social scale of life, still are entitlc. , thit- 'i&.,
haL Jani c . z)n i iaver n n rabbe n e may ben ia c-La.m
and it is only by the express will of the people when
the business so disastroust our country is forbidden
by a statute so plain that tn :re can be no mistake, that
the conmmon law can be changed and I shall attempt to
follow the decisions of the various Oourts and to
distinguish as far as possible the many conflicting
views, for judges look upon the innocence of mens minds
witb differnt degrees of judicial allowance and I
have come to the conclusion after a long investigation
that to quote the words of one of thj most emincnt
of writers on Criminal law to-day, Mr. Bishop,"That
Criminal Intent is the essence of the crime'
Chap. I
( Definitions---Distinction between MOTIVE
and INTENT---Acts MALUM IN SE contrasted with acts
MALUM PROHIRITUM.)
In laying do,:;n the broad proposition 'hat there
is no crime without Criminal intent _ encounter some
differench of opinion , in many courts of the country
they hold that there may be certain crimes without the
intent basing there decisions somewhat upon the particu-
lar Statutes,,Judge Cooley says that undoubtedly the
general rule is that there is no crime without the
intent but he qualifies it by saying that this rule
is open to many exceptions.
'TO satisfactory definition can be given of' Criminal Inte-
nt and I submit not without some hesitation the
following. 'Evil Intent is a malicious will Qxpresed
in a criminal act.
In order to get a clear idea of the subject let us
distinguish INTENT from MOTIVE.
Motive is the moving cause or that which induces an act
for example,--A being desirous of getting B's gold
watch shoots him the motive that induced him to commit
the act was the desire to obtain the watch while the
INTENT, is the purpose or design with which it is
2done , as for example---In the above case the intent
was shown in his resolution to kill B .
There may be an intent without a motive as where
a man filled with a malicious desire to injure some
one kills a man--There he has no reason or cause
that made him commit the act but he has the intent
or design to do the deed, but in order to have a
crime we must have in additiontthe evil intent,
the act, for the simple design to do an unlawful thing
so long as it remains a mere intention is not cognizable
under the criminal law and the person so harboring
an evil intention cannot be punished by any human
tribunal as no humanJudge can search the heart otherwise
than they are expressed by outward signs, while morally
aman whose heart is filled with an evil intentwould
no doubt be as guiltyas though the intention had been
carried into -;ffect and the act had been done ,
So while in order to have a crime we must have an
intent yet that intent may be drawn from the act itself
as where--A kills B the law presumes an evil intent
and in order to make the crime it does not have to
be shown but the prisoner may overcome this presumption
of intent and show that it was done accidentally o:- in
self defence or that he was insae at the time &c.
In many crimes this general intent is presumed but in
3others there must be a special intent) and whenever
this exists no crime is complete withaout showing
the particular intent that is required by the tatute,
as for example---. 'Atatute prohibits under a penalty
any on e who passes counterfeit money T. OWING that
it was counterfeit, A passes counterfeit money ,
in order to establish the crime specified, you must
show that he did it KNOWINGLY thereby showing the
special intent,and if knowledge cannot be proved then
there is no crime.
these are some of the divisions of the subject of
intent but thete are two general classes into which
all crimes may be divideone ( malum in se)is an act
which shocks the moral sense of the community as
being against good morals or an act which if allowed to
stand would be injurious to the welfare of tIe people,
as a body, and there can be only one sentiment of
condemnatiom. "Pxamples of such acts are seen in murder
where the welfare of the public demands that it shall
be declared criminal regardless of a Statute to that
effect#
But there is another class(malum prohibitum) which do
not effect the morals of the community to such a
degreeas to demand their punishment regardless of law
but are only considered criminal when expressly provided
4so by Statute, a familiar example is found in the
selling of intoxicatingf liquors, this in itself is not
such a businessas demands the public condemnation
but its effects upon the morals of the community are
such that it has been deemed advisable to hedge it
about with restrictions and make the selling of liquors
except as following the way presoribid by Statute
a criminal offense#
In this case above, whether the sale would be malum
in se or malum prohibitum would depend to a great
degree upon the advancement of the conmunity where the
act was done, for a country might be so far advanced
that its effects would be considered so disastrous
as to render it malum in se and punishable without a
Statute while in a country not so far advanced it
would require a Statute to secure the desired end,
IN treating of acts malum in se and malum prohibitum
the question would naturally arise"Y'suppose an act is
done unintentionally while doing an act &aXum in se
what would be the punishment, as for example---A
while robbing a house is discovered by its owner B
and in the scuffle which ensues B is shot by the ac-
cidental discharge of A's pistol-- Is A guilty of
murder or manslaughter or is he to be acquitted on the
ground of accidental killing?
5Sowith an act which is not malum in se but malun jprohib-
itian, as for example,---A while shooting game out of
season accidentally shoots Bwho was there unknown to A.--
Is A to be punished and if so for what crime?
Coke lays down two propositions which have beam quoted
many times with approval.
FIRST, Any person while in the cormmision of a
felony accidentally kills another he is guilty of murder
'-'Wn1D. A person while in the commZsion of an
act not malum in se but a misdeMeatooes an act by
which death ensues to another he is not ggilty of
murder but is guilty of manslaughter.
These divisions were satisfactory at conmon law, because
at that time ,every felony involvea the forfeiture
of the lands or goods of the offender upon a conviction
of the offense, and nearly all offenses of that grade
were punishable with death with or without the benefit
of -lergy,. so it made but very little difference whether
a man was convicted of murder or manslaughter for the
penalty would be death in each case, but as criminal
law advaneedthe injustice of the punishment for these
two crimes beimg the same when the circumstances
producing them were so unlike became apparent and
to-day in the Penal Code of our States they are seperate
6and distinct, and while the rule laid down by Coke
is applied with all its harshness in some jurisdictions
yet it is apparent that it must be taken with some
limitations, for instance ---A having malice against B
seeks after him with the deliberate design of killing
him, he finds him and while trying to carry his plans
into ex cution shoots and kills C an innocent bystander
No one would contend for a moment that A should not be
punished for killing C the same as though he had been
the person desired, but let us alter the casesomcwhat
supposing A had got into a heated discussion with B
and had com e to blows and in the affray which ensued
C an innocent bystander was shot by A would thisb b
considered murder?
It would be by Cokes definition because a felony was
being committedand an innocent man was killed but if
he had killed B. Awould have been only guilty of
manslaughter and he certainly would not be held to a
more serious offense when an innocent party was killed
accidentally, because the death of a third party is
certainly not more grevious thanthe killing of the
party taking part in the affray.
The Courts hold that in order to make murder it is not
necessary that personal violence be used to the third
7person as for example---in Adams v. 'eople 109 I11.444
where the train robbers were on the train and by threats
intimidated the passengers and one jumped from the train
while in motion being terrified an was killed the
Court said that this was murder because the doing of
a felony produced a certain effect and the offender
must be held for all acts done under its influence,
In coming to Cokes second rule"That a person in the
commission of an act not malum in se but a misdemeanor
does an act by which death ensues to another he is not
guilty of murder but manslaughter" This must be limited
to the extent that reasonable caution being used when
the person was killed will excuse, as when A shoots
game out of season , a misdemeanor in itself, and being
reckless and without due caution shoots another he will
be guilty of manslaughter but if he had used due caution
in the shooting of the game and a third person had been
killed then it would have been axcusable, the suffi-
ciency or insufficiency of the caution is the principal
thing.
In the cases cited there is the general intent to do
the wrong, a wrong being contemplated it makes no
difference upon whom the act falls if the intent co-
operates with the act,
Chap, II.
--- General doctrine of Criminal Intent--
Criminal Intent is of the essence of the crime.
While as a general proposition all the text writers
and Judges agree that in order to have a crime we must
have a Criminal imtent attached to the act yet some
make so many exceptions and qualifications to the rule
that it has to a more or less extent become an unsettled
proposition.
At common law it was certainly true that there was no
crime without the intent for Blackstone in his Com-
mentaries says " Indeed, to make a complete crime
cognizable by human laws there must be both a will and
an act ------and as a vicious will, without a vicious
act is no civil crime, so , on the other hand ,an
unwarraible act without a vicious will is no crime at
all" (a).
A person in order to make a crime must have an evil
mind, punishment id not designed for those who, while
perhaps doing an unlawful act still has a pure mind,
to punish such a one would be contrary to natural justice.
It ismalike the general rule of law and dictates of
material justice that to constitute guilt there must
(a) Blackstone's Comm. (Chases ED.)page86I
9not only be a wrongful act but a criminal intention
under our system both must be found by the jury to
justify a conviction for crime" (a)
If this was not true any person committing any act
no matter whether laboring under a disability or not
would be obliged to suffer, but many persons ars excepted
from punishment, a child for example , under seven
years of age shoots a man dead he certainly cannot be
punished because the law has thrown about him its pro-
tection and it has declaredthat it will not allow evidence
even to be admitted to show the evil intent, because
it is conclusively presumed, that he was to young to
form the evil intentionto do the deed, and yet under
some of the Statutes of the differnt States which pro-
hibits in general termsit would not be considered -
for a moment that a child under seven years of age
could be punished and still the Courts claim that the
intent has been eliminated from the crime and a person
does the act at his peril, and so it is so with lunatics
no matter how heinous was the crime or under what cir-
cumstances it was committed yet they cannot be punished
because one is not punishedbecause he has done the act
----------------- -------------------
(a) People *v,.qlack 125 N.Y.3249
I0
but because he has done it with an evil intent.
The criminal jurisprudence of this or any other ci~il-
ized country, so far as I have been able to find, does
not record an instance where an idiot or lunatic known
to be such has been punished for his crimes because it
would be inflicting punishment upon a person morally
innocent.
In comparison with those laboring under disabilities
and who are protected becausetheir minds are pure
we must noticeanother condti-on,thoso acts which are
unla:ful but h! .vc boon done by accident here e LavC
t-- i, layjiul Lct the deed done but ijut th(, cffcnccr
be i)J 1 ±ished? Certainly not he when the act was done
had no evik intentions and we have the bare unlawful
act which cannot be punished, so in the case of a deed
.done in line of duty, an executioner executes another
under the mandates of the law here the deed is done
but it is considered in law to be justifiable,
CHAP. I I I.
MWfl) CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES.
In the chapters to follow it seems
absolutely necessary to understandhow the different
Statutes passed under differnt conditions and by differnt
Legislatures shall be interpreted and so the construction
of Penal Statutes will be treated briefly,-Penal-
because the subject of Statutory Construction is so
vasta one that it would require a study by itself and
also because we are considering only the Penal side
of the question.
" Penal Statutes are all acts as in terms impose a
fine or corporal punishment under sentence in State
prosecutions or forfeiture to the State as a punitory
consequence of violating laws made for the preservation
of the peace and good order of society also all acts
which impose by way of punishment any pecuniary mulct
or damage beyond compensation for the benefit of the
injured party or recoverable by an informer or which
for like purpose, impose any special burden or take away
or impair any privelege or right/" (a)
The common law is the source of our criminals;
wellas our civil jurisprudence and as has been expressed
by Coke" To know. what the common law was before the
making of a Statute whereby it may be seen whether the
cz++,.r.,t+nvv c)-r n rew law or onlv affirmative
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of the common law is the very lock and key to set
open the windows of the Statute",
And when we come to construe a Statute made by the
Legislature it. should be construed if possible in acccvd-
ance with the common law and account should be taken
of what the law was before the passage of the act for
when the written and the unwritten law the same as
wheptwo Statutes stand together without conflict up to
a certain point th ere is no repeal, for both Statutes
are not conflicting but as soon as a conflict arise
then one or the other falls,
A Statute may be shortened or lengthened by the common
law or to explain more fully the common law may take
away from the Statute, some of its original force,
as for example---A Statute is passed in general terms
prohibiting a certain thing under a penalty, but if
the act was done by a lunatic he cannot be punishedbecauee
it is a common law principle that that class of offen-
ders are exempted from the penalty of the law, and
it thereby shortens the literal of the Statute so a
Statute will not generallymake an act criminal however
broad may be its language unless the offenders intent
concurred with his actd because the common law declares
that the intent is the necessary element ofievery crime
13
In the same way a Statute may be added to by the pro-
visions of the common law.
Keeping in mind that resort must be had to the common
law to add to or take awayfrom a Statute elements necess-
ary to be added to or taken away from, the first and
primary rule in construction is that you must seek the
Legislative intent(a), first from the words of the
Statute if they can be ascertained and if the words of
theStatute convey no satisfactory meaning then you must
look to the surrounding circumstances, taking into
consideration the existing state of affairs that called
for the passage of the law and after a consideration
of all these questions, it is for the Couttto say
what was the intention of the Legislatuvo, bearing in
mind that the presumption is against a change of the
common law unless theStatute is explicit and clear in
that direction.(bI. (a)
In ascertaining the legislative intent many questions
must be examined for in many instancesimakes its language
so broad that it brings every thing within it and
indeed it is the general plan of ourcriminal legislation
to define or at least to forbid particular actledving
----------------- 4---- -----------------
(a) smith.v. People 47 N.Y.336
(b)People.v PalmerIO9 N.Y. II0
(c) Potter's Dwarris on Statutes&C p. 185
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for example the question of intent to be determined
in each by the rules of the cormmon law and in all
cases whatever competent age sanity and some degree of
fredom from some kinds of coercion are assumed to be
essential to criminality but I do not think that they
are ever intro du ced into any Statute by which any
crime is defined (s). Having found the intention with
which the Statute was passed this law must be construed
strictly for it is a principle of criminal law that a
Penal Statute must be construed strictly against the
accused and favorably and equitably for him (a) *
the reason why this should be so is obvious for no man
can be subjected to the penalty of a Statute unless he
is within both the letter and the spirit of the law,
this rule does not exist in civil cases because thc±
a persons liberty is not in question as in criminal
prosecutionw, where the unfortunate is entitled to
have the Statute construed strictlyas to matters that
tend to prosecute him, but liberally as to matters
which would tend to release him-
When a Statute declaresa certain thing to be criminal
you cannot go outside of the Statute for the purpose of
(a)Myers *v, State I Conn.502
kb) 40 Alb. Law Journal 250
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bringiQ'4c-atters not strictly prescribed by the Statute
for exam: le--- In a caeewhere the l1.w forbid the selling
of certain articles and an exchange was made and the
person was indicted, the Court held, that the word
sale in a penal Statute does not include an exchange. (a)
and the Courts went even so far at common law as to hold
that under a Statute forbidding the stealing of horses
that ,.hen one HORSE was stolen that the Statute did
not cover it and a new Statute was passed to cover that
specific case (b) so by a Statute stating that the
stealing of sheep or other cattle should be
considered a felony it was held that this expression
(or other cattle) was to loose and only applied to
sheep and here also another Statute was passed to remedy
the difficulty (c)but I cannot say that at the present
time so close a construction would be made.
The construction while it must be made strictly yet it
cannot be so strict as to override the manifest intent
of the Legislature and when the question comes up as to
whether the strict construction or the intent should
governthe intent if plain will be considered binding
on the Court.
-------------- # -------------------------
(a) Gunter . V . Lecky. 30 Ala.59I
(b)I Edward VI. Ch* 12
(c) I5 Geo. III. Ch. 34
Chap. IV,
.... IGNORATCE OF FACT -t
Many Statutes are passed for the purpose of protecting
the public health and the public welfare and the question
very often arises when the strict letter of the law
has been violated but without any intention on the part
of the accused to violate the law and what he has done
has been done honestly, whether his honest mistake will
discharge him or must he suffer the penalty of the law.
Perhaps no better case can be found to illzstrate the
ggneral doctrine than that of State 'I Gardner,bNev.378
In that case a man was indicted for issuing licenses
unlawfully, it came out on the trial that the licenses
were undoubtedly issued and the strict letter of the
law violated but without any intention to do so and the
Court saidin deciding that case " That nothing short
of the intent to do the forbidden thing will make a
man criminal, when such intent is wanting hecoranits
no offence in lawthough he does tha act completely
within all the words of the Statutewhich prohibits the
acts1 being silent concerning the intentS.
After a consideration of the cases it seems to me that
this is the true rule but in the State of Massachusetts
we-have the opposite view illustrated for under a Statute
prohibitin the sale of adulterated milk,
17
In general words without reference to the intentit was
there held that the intent was immaterial, that it
was a Statute intended to promote the public health and
good and the selling of milk zas done at the vendorsperil.
Supposing a case where the vendor selling milk had
that milk adulterated by some enemy of his or,put a
stronger case, suppose if it be possible that the cow
gave milk below the standard, and unbeknown to him
he sells that milk, he is arrested and in the course of
the trial he tries to introduce evidence of his good
faith which is rejected as immaterial, he is convicted
and punished.
Under what system of law or justice can this be just-
ified?
He certainly had violated a Statute but under such
circumstances that he was entirely ignorant of the fact,
he certainly was engaged in a legitimatu businessone
thkt benefitted the public, if he is punished the strict
letter of the law will be carried out a man known to be
innocent by all will suffer for no cause of his and the
public will not be benefitted fol if he engages in the
business again he will run the same risks as before
and if he leaves it as a business too perilous to be
engaged in it will be to the detriment of the public
18
"And when we consider also that it was not deserved
but a gratuitous and wTicked wrong to one whom everbody
deemed to be morally innoce nt no fit words to character-
ize it is found in the language', (a)
"IGNORAICE OF FACT EXCUSES" is the maxim of the law*
The first step in the direction taken by the Massachusett
Courts was taken under a Statute'imposing a penalty
upon any person who, having a former husband or wife
shall marry another person,---except any person whose
husband or wifeshall have been continually remaining
beyond the sea or shall have voluntarily withdrawnfrom
the other and remained absent for the period of seven
yearsthe party marrying again not knowing the other to
be living within that time'
Suppose a husband is engaged on some perilous business
and is brought home dead one day and is burhd by the
widow, two years afterwards she marries again and is
indicted for polyagamy the Court would not allow that
she could prove the death of the absent husband only by
showing a seven years absence so she must go to prison
whie her former husband was known to be buried but
suppose a casein the above that the body had been burned
add disfiguredyet the identification was pronounced
satisfactory b$ the widow and friends and afterwards
it should appear that the body buried was that of
anotherand the husband had left the country*
The widow marries again in three years and is indicted
for polygamy here was evidence of death satisfactory
to any Court, the intent of the woman was precisely the
same she obeyed the law to the best of her ability and
knowledge, cautiously and honestly she proceeded yet
this avails her nothing she has violated the Statute
and by Massachusetts law she must be punished*
The object of punishment is not so much to punish the
criminal himself as to keep others from committing the
same actwhen this woman is punished neither object is
gained, she has not committed a crimemorally and no
matter how severe the punishment may be it cannot keep
others from making the same innocent mistake, a very
differentgWould have existed if negligence could have
been proven because a willful disregard of the IA&w is
as bad as a willful v Ilatteadof it and it was said in
a ease where a young man thought that he had a right to
vote and did so when in fact he did not have the right
"That the criminal intention being of the essence of the
crime if the intent is dependent on a knowledgeof partic-
ular facts a want of such knowledge, not the result of
carelessness or negligence relieves the act of criminalit!-
(a)-------------------
(a) Gordon,V, state 52 Alag 308
20
and he was acquitted so in a case where a manafter due
inquiry as to the age of a person and under a bona fide
belief that he was of age allowed him to play billiards
and was indicted under a Statute prohibiting minors
to play and persons allowing them to do so it was said
by the CourtthatwIt is clear to us that if the Defendant
after due diligence thought honestly that this young man
was not a minor he is not guilty, if he did so think
after proper inquiry the element of intent does not
exist, the act was done under a mistake of fact, in
such a case , there is no guilt and no crime/ (a)
It was said many years ago by one of the greatestJurists
in England, that ever sat upon the bench,Lord Mansfield,
that in a case of libel that while it was prima facie
evidence against him that it was not conclusive (b)
An honest .. e mistake of facts cannot help but
exist in any place where the people are energetic,
for try as best they may,aocidents will happen aid perhap.
the greatest auiber of cases arise under th:) excise
laws of the States
------------------
(a) Stern.V, State 53 Ga, 229 (21 Am* Rep,266)
(b) Rex IV/ Almon 5 Burom 2688
The sale of intoxicating liquors has been regarded
aw . questionable business and has been regulated
by Legislative enactments for many years past and the
Legislature in their zeal to over come so great an evil
are liable to go beyond the strict rules of reason and
many of the States have passed Statutes absolutely
prohibiting in general words the sale of intoxicating
liquors except under certain restrictions, and the
seller, hedged about by these restrictions ,sells liquor
honestly and by using all the means in his power to
ascertain the truthillegally, according to the strict
letter of the law and it is sought to punish such a
one for an honest mistake of facts,
In Mulread/v, State 7 N*Ee 884 under a Statute
which prohibited directly o* indirectly the sale barter
or gift of intoxicating liquors to any person under the
age of twenty-one years under a penalty it was held--
that if the seller should sell to a minorunder the
honest belief that he was not a minor and after due
diligence being exercised and no negligence being shown
that there vias no criminal intent and without this
there was no crime.
22
In the construction of such a Statute as this which
prohibited absolutely let us apply briefly some of the
rules of construction, we must first look to the intent,
it was obviously the intent of the Legislatureto stop
the sale of liquor to minors i. said PWhoever directly
or indirectly sells or barters~jc shall be guilty"
it excepts no one, criminal intent is not referred too
and as a Statute however broad may be its terms must
be construed by the principles of the coninon law we
must infer that the Legislature in laying down this
Statute and in not referring in the Statute to any of
the elements necessary to make a certain thing w@iminal
must have intended that the missing elements shouldbe
added by the well known principles of the criminal law
and viewing it in this light, which I think must be
admittedis the reasonable construction, the intent to
do the act would be an essential, if the Legislature
had desired to change the comnnonlaw no one will dispute
for a mo mentbut what it is in their power to do so
but the presumption is that no such change is intended
unless the intent of the Legislature to do so is explicit
and clear,(a)
(a) PeopleoV, Palmer 109 NOY, 110
23
There are two opposite viewstaken by the Courts on
the construction of these kinds of Statutes --
one taking the side that the law should be humane and
the other that it should be enforced without reference
to the hardship it may make; these views are widely
divergent and the cases cannot be by any means reconciled
--as a good illustrationof the later doctrine I will
cite but one case to illustrate it StateV. Essex Club
20 Atlantic 769 holding that under a Statute prohibit-
ing in general terms the sale of intoxicating liquors
that a conviction can be had irrespective of the guilty
intent it was said in that case quoting from Halstead,
V. State 41 N,J,Lawthat "The question(of intent )
appertains to the department of Statutory *onstruction
and to introduce into;tthe requsite of a guilty mind
it must appaar that such was the intent of the law
makers' as has been said above all our Statutes are
based upon the commonlaw, and everything the common
law gave id left unless it has been taken away expressly
by the Statute now in the above case the Legislature
was silent on the question of intent and therefore
by the strict rules of reasoning the element of intent
ought to have been considered an essential,
ChapV
LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR ACTS OF HIS SERVANT DONE IN
THE COURSE OF nIS EMP LOYENT AND Ii WILLFUL VIOLATION
OF HIS 'ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS&
Perhaps one of the most interesting questions
in the criminal law of to- day is as to the question
whether a principal who takes ordinary care in the
selection of his servants and hires those who in his
best judgment are qualified to carry on his business
and after instructing them what to do and what not to
doafter all this has been done, and the agent in willful
violationsof his orders does an act contrary to the
Statute does he bind his principal crimimally,
As was said as to ignorance of fact that the decisions
could not be reconciled so here it is the same, the same
two ideas being most prominelt in the Minds of the
judges---humanity on the one side---enforcement of the
laws on the other--and the Court as it has been impelled
by one or the other of these motives have decided the
particular case and it must be called asa whole an
unsettled question,
'A servant as applied to criminal law is an actual
bona fi~erepresentative of his principal in the par-
ticular transaction with his consent or concurrenceo'(a)
The rules applicable to liability of principal civilly
--------------- B#n ---------------
(a) Barnes OV, State, 19 Coin. 397,
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for acts of his agent do not accord withthe principles
governing the criminal liability (a).
Civilly the principal is liable for the torts of his
agents (a)whether the principal knew of the criminal
acts of his agent or not or even if the agent had done
the act willfully contrary to instructions of principal
yet he would not be discharged bacause the law assumes
that considering the nature of the business engaged in
that he will not engage i ncompetent agents to act for
himand if he does choose an agent the law regards the
act of the agent to be the act of the p:incipal and the
principal must respond in damages to the injured party!
but in criminal law the reasons upon which this rule of
justice rests do not apply with equal forceand as a
general rule a principal cannot be held criminally
for the acts of his agent committed without his knowledge
and consent(b) for it will be readily seen that the
intent is the necessarj element of the crime which
cannot exist when the principal is deceived by his
agent willfully.
------------- ltim----
(a) Hipp.V.State5 Blackf, 149
(b) ComnV, Nichols 10 Metcalf 259
StateV. McCance 19 S.W,648
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Many cases have come before the Courts of last rosort
in the various States. State.V. McCance a late case
illustrates the doctrinejhere the Def. was indicted
under a Statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors to minorshe proved at the trial that the sale
was made Jay his bar- keeper unbeknown to him and against
his strict orders the question came up squarely on the
interpretation of the Statute and the Court said *Let
it be conceded that the business of selling liquor is
not commendable from a moral sta ndpoint, still the
Legislature has seen fit to license it andmake it a
source of revenue to our municipalities, after the
dramshop keeper has fully complied with the Statute, in
establishing his character as a man of good morals,
entered into bonds to keep the peace and not to,sell to
minoishe is licensed to retail liquor and it seems to
us in construing this Statutewe ought if possible while
giving full efect to the intention of the Legislature
at the same time to observe those well settled rules
and weil grounded principles of natural justice that
are the basis of all enlightened jurisprudence and
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not to break down the safe guards of the Constitution
which are for the protcctio.. t Lvc.j pt,.:o n charged
with crime"# And tlhy held that the principal was not
liable and this mub& appeal to thu justice of every man,
for a man by sellin, liquor contrary to law violatos
the law and the presumption is against him (a) which
can be rebutted by other evidence and then it is a
question for the jury to say whether under all the
circumstances which existed the principal acted honestly
and in good faith for certainly if bad faith existed
and the jury believe that his instructions to his agent
were made in such a manner so that he desired them to be
disobeyed or he was negligent in any way then he would
be held liable for any act that his agent might commit
in the course of his emplopnent but as reasonable as
this may seem still we find many cases holding a contrary
doctrine, taking fof example). 'State .V. Kittle 15 S.EI02
where it was held by a divided court that the principal
was liable, but the reasoning upon which the majority
based their decision is unsound in principle,
The liquor traffic when legalized by theState h s a
right to be treated like any other legal business
-------------Mc ----------------
(a) State.V, McCarice 19 SW9 648
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and the dealer who deals in it however low he may be
morally still legally he is entitle to the benefit of
the lawand in carrying on his business he must employ
those who shall work under him for no large enterprise
can be carried onby one man he therefore hires his
servants itis now saidthat since he derives profits
from the concern that he ought to be held for all acts
done in the course of his business and the answer to ;his
is* that hk is bound, civilly(a) for any and all acts
of his agent while in the course of his employment and
a money judgment may be collected against the principal
by those qualified to brimg the action, this is suf-
ficient, the persons are indemnified ant if thay can
show fraudthen a criminal action will lie against the
master. A further remedy exists, the person who actually
sold the liquoris liable criminally(b) regardless of the
actionagainst the principal because no action against
his master will avoid his guilty wrongs therefore a
possible three actions will lie,--Civil against the
principal--Criminal against the agent--Criminal against
the principal if fraud can be shown,
Itis also said that it is necessaryto have a criminal
----------------- #----------------
(a) Hipp.V, State 5 Blackf. 149,,
(b)Reese.V, State 73 Ala. 18
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action against principal because if it was not so a
principal might get a licenseand then hire a most in-
competent person to run the business an-. as was said
in one case" Bow himself out and leave the servant to
run the businessas he wished " but the answer to this
argument is plain,a principal would not be likely to
pursue this course when every dollar he made and more
too might be taken away by a civil action and he -lso
might be punished criminally for his negligent acts and
find himself in prison, this certainly would be a
singular chapter in business principles.
Moreover a licensee iolds his license only by sufferance)
so too speak~and if any act is done which is illegal
it will invalidate the license(Al|
It is strange to see how the same Coulpt will look at
two different situations almost analogous. The Court of
Massachusetts declared that if a sale of adulterated
milkwas made the offender could be punished regardless
of the intent, but a different view is taken on the
liquor question for in CommV* Nichols 10 Metcalf
259 where a sale was made by a servant contrary to
-----------------------------
(a) ComnmV * Wachendorf 141 Mass.271.
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instructions the Court said that the sale was only
prima facie evidence of sale by the mastar,not conclusive
proofand" Ifa sale of liquor is made by The servant
without the knowledge of the master and really in opposi-
tion to his will and in no way participated in by him
or approved and this is clearly shown he ought to
be acquitted" and this commendable decision was followed
in Conm*,V* Stevens 26 NE.992, for if this was not the
law a principal might arise in the morning and find
that the night before his servants had done some act
which without his knowledge or consent woild sweep away
all his property and land him in prison but this canno$
ordinaril7 . be done unless the people prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that there was negligence or bad
faith by the principal in order to convict him of a
crime under the Statutes (a).
The conviction ofa master for the acts of his agent
cannot rest upon public policy alone but must rest upon
some pkinciple, and this principle must necessarily be
that in criminal cases the actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the agent is the knowledge of the principal$
(a) 0 onmn,V, HAyes. 145 Mass, 289
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Let a case be supposed where the buying of liquor between
certain hours of the day would be prohibited, a clerk
buys it contrary to law against the express wishes of
his master the master according to this principle must
be liable to a criminal prosecution but suppose he
bought this liquor knowing that it was stolen the
innocent master if this principle be allowed to stain
our system of justicebe condemned to a long term of
imprisonmenthe did nothing that was criminal but he
must suffer because he was so sonstituted that he was
not Omnipresent,
Itis to be greatly desired that Larceny be suppressed
and the public demand it but it would be more than
unjustif the guilty knowledge which is required univer-
ally by all law should be overlooked and the honest
merchant be exposed to the punishment of a felon#
A conviction in the above case would not be received
as the settled law of any State*
The familiar maxim; ' Qui facit per alium, facit per se--
has been used to justify the criminal proceeding but it
is only applicable to criminal cases where the instruct-
ionof the principal has been obeyed and not violated(a).
and it was said in that case khere the wife had committed
---------------------------------
(a) State.V. Baker 71 Mo. 475
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the offence contrary to the advice of her husband"That
itwas her independent act which resulted in a violation
of the law for if she had followed ti instructions
of her husband no offense would have been connitted
and for this act the husband is not responsiblemand
when liquor is keptlwfully for sale and is sold un-
lawfullyand is sold by a clerk there is no criminal
action againstprincipal because there is no unlawful
intent which is an essential ingredient of the crime(a)
The argument has been many times idvanced that if an
injustice has been done by the Court or the Legislature
tha-t resort should be had to the pardoning power of
the Executive in other wordsthat the Courts should
follow the strict letter of the law and leave it to the
Governor to distribute justice. Canit be possible that
the electionof an Executive is for the purpose of dealing
out justice to offenders that the Courts might do them-
selves? It seems not,in extreme cases resort is had
to Executive clemency but it is comparitively rare
speaking in comparison with the great number of convic-
tionsit is the sphere of the Legislature to make the
----------------- 
# ------- -
(a) State *V, Hayes 67 Iowa 271
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laws considering the needs of the peopleat large and
then it is for the Courts t& interpret them according
to the well defined rules of the law and it is not
for them to declare when it is so evident as in the
question here that no relief can be granted but that
resort should be had to the Executive where if an in-
justice has been doneit can be remedied,
Chap VI*
-44INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME---
It is a legal maxim of the lawthat a man shall not
disable himself and if he knowingly takes any means
by which he is disabled it gives the criminal intent
and if while doing one act which was wrong he does another
it is none the less criminal, Voluntary intoxication
has been considered by all writers as no defense to
crimeand at common law it was not only considered not
a defense to crime but an aggravation of it for
Blackstone says' Our law Iboks upon this as an aggravation
of the offense, rather than as an excuse for any criminal
misbehavior' (a) and Sir Edward Coke declared* That a
drunkard had no privelege thereby but what hurt or ill
soever he doth his drunkenness doth aggravate it*
but this must be wrong for example---a man while in
his full senses being angry killed a man this w;ould
be manslaughtersanother khile under the influence of
liquorcominitted a similar crime now ought this man
who was intoxicatedbe punished for murder because the
deed was done while he wasunder the influence of liquor
- -----a ns- o
(a) Blackstone's Conim.(Ghases Ed,+ p. 866.
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and the one who had his fall sense be allowed to suffer
only the punishment for manslaughter? This doctrine
has been repudiated and while intoxication is considered n
no defense still it does not aggravate the crime (a)
The rule was laid down in State.V, Bundy 58 Am, Repe
266 where the Court said* Some cases may be found
which suggest limitations of the rule especially as
to reducing murder to manslaughter by the indulgence
extended to the natural weakness of sudden heat and
passionbut we think that the broad current of opinion
holds the wise old doctrine that voluntary intoxication
of whatever degree is no excuse for crime comitted
under its influence, Azny other principle would be
destructive to the peace and order of society, every
murderer would sock himself'in the liquor for the double
purposeof nerving himself for the act and of sheltering
his intended crime,' This is the almost universal
doctrine partly held upon the grounds that intoxication
is so easily feined and under this guise intended acts
may be committedthat it is necessary to the administration
of justice but in some classes of crimes as in murder
---------------- II -umhrey----.
(a) HalleeVe State II jumphrey 154,
deliberation and premeditation make the difference
between murder in the first and in the second degree
and it is there a question for the jury to say as to
the state of the persons mind at the time of the com-
mission of the deed (a) as was said in Swan.V. State
4 Humphrey 136 that though drunkenness in point of law
constitutes no excuse or justification in law for crime
still when the nature and essence of a crime is made to
depend by law upon the peculiar state of the criminals
mind at the time and to reference to the act done,
drunkenness as a matter of fact affecting such state
and condition of the mind is a proper subject for the
jury3 . But where an act if done by a sober man
would be murder it can not be reduced to manslaughter
by showing the absence of deliberation by reason of
the mans intoxication (b).
The most of the cases arising under the subject of
intoxication are capitol offences and it is desired
by showing the intoxication to reduce thedegree of the
crime and while it has been held that intoxication
by reason of the state of mind may reduce murder from
(a) People.V, Mills 98 N.Y, 182,
(b) Kenney,V, people 31 NOY. 330.
the first to the second degree it will not reduce the
crime to manslaughter.
Insanity in the case of intoxication, as in the case
of any crime, will excuse when produced by habitual
drunkenness (a) but no matter how high the frenzywas at
the time of the commnission of the crime
while the person was intoxicated it will not excuse him
for it was said in ScottqV, State 12 Texas Appe 31.
I That if the acts which constitute the crime are excused
or justified they are not criminal',
It was said at the beginning that intoxication was no
defense for crime, this as a general proposition is
correct but o ne exception must be noticed, where the
special intent is necessary to produce the crime as in
larceny" Taking the articles with the intent to steal
them* or in the case of passing counterfeit money knowing
that it was counterfeit, in this class of cases which
depends upon a guilty knowledge it should be submitted
to the jury (-for them to say whether under all the
circumstances of the case the person was so intoxicated
that he could not form the special intent necessary
(a) U*SV, Drew 5 Mason 281,
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to the coninission of the crime, then if the jury find
that the intent was lacking they musy acquit, this was
considered in a case of passing counterfeit money without
the knowledge of its being counterfeit the person
being so intoxicated at the time and the Court held
that it was a sufficient defense,(a)
But this exception applies to but very few cases and
hardly affects the general rule, it is hardely necessary
to say that if the party was induced by means of threats
or device to become intoxicated and it was not his
free act and a crime was committed he will be excused,
this would be only justice,
-(- Pia V---t- -----------------
(a) pigman *Vl State 14 Ohio 555,
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